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Criminal Law/Evidence-ADMISSIBILITY

OF THIRD-PARTY

TESTIMONY ON OUT-OF-COURT STATEMENTS MADE TO A WITNESS

THROUGH AN INTERPRETER-Chao

v. State, 478 So. 2d 30

(Fla. 1985)
I.

INTRODUCTION

Alfredo Chao was arrested for attempted first-degree murder after shooting his ex-girlfriend. Chao asked his uncle, Pedro Mendez,
to summon a police officer so he could surrender. The officer,
Detective Rigdon, advised Chao of his rights using a Miranda card
printed in Spanish. Chao read and signed the card. Then, with
Mendez translating, Detective Rigdon questioned Chao about the
shooting. At trial, Chao maintained that the shooting had occurred
accidentally. Detective Rigdon was sworn in as a witness and testified: "I asked Mr. Mendez to please ask Mr. Chao why did he
shoot the girl. They had a conversation in Spanish. Mr. Mendez
replied to me, 'He says he shot her because he loves her and wants
no other man to have her.' "1 Based on this testimony, Chao was
convicted.
Chao's one point on appeal was that Detective Rigdon's testimony constituted inadmissible hearsay and should have been excluded. 2 The Third District Court of Appeal held that the testimony was not hearsay and was therefore admissible.3 In Chao v.
State,4 the Florida Supreme Court affirmed Chao's conviction but
came to a different conclusion on the evidentiary issue. The court
held that while the detective's testimony was hearsay, it was admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule.
In this Note, the author analyzes the problems inherent in the
use of extrajudicial statements made through an interpreter and
examines the history of Florida law on this issue. Finally, the author discusses the rationale of the Chao decision and its usefulness
in predicting the admissibility of similar testimony in future criminal trials.
II.

GENERAL HEARSAY FORMULATIONS

The Federal Rules of Evidence and the Florida Evidence Code
define hearsay as "a statement, other than one made by the declar1.
2.

3.
4.
5.

Chao v. State, 478 So. 2d 30, 31 (Fla. 1985).
Id.; FLA. STAT. § 90.801(1)(c) (1985).
Chao v. State, 453 So. 2d 878 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), aft'd, 478 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 1985).
478 So. 2d at 30.
Id. at 32.
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ant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted." Generally, a hearsay
statement is inadmissible at trial7 unless it falls within a specific
statutory exception.' This prohibition is based on several concerns:
a declarant who makes a hearsay statement has not spoken under
oath; there is no opportunity for a jury to evaluate the credibility
of the declarant; the person recounting the out-of-court statement
may do so inaccurately; and, most importantly, there is no opportunity for the party against whom the statement is made to crossexamine an absent declarant whose statement is being reported.9
Because the testimony of a third-party witness regarding out-ofcourt statements made through an interpreter is based upon the
translation alone rather than an understanding of the declarant's
own words, and there may be no opportunity to cross-examine either the declarant or the interpreter about the asserted statements,
use of such testimony implicates the concerns underlying the hearsay rule.
Jurisdictions differ in their treatment of out-of-court statements
made through an interpreter. 10 Several courts have held this testimony inadmissible hearsay;" in other jurisdictions, courts consider
12
it admissible but do not agree on the legal theory that applies.
6. FED. R. EVID. § 801(c); FLA. STAT. § 90.801(1)(c) (1985).
7. FLA. STAT. § 90.802 (1985).
8. In addition to the specific exceptions to the hearsay rule, the Federal Rules of Evidence include "catch-all" provisions which allow the court to admit hearsay evidence where
there are
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, [which would be met] if
the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material
fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than
any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts;
and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be
served by admission of the statement into evidence.
FED. R. EVID. §§ 803(24), 804(b)(5).
The Florida Evidence Code, FLA. STAT. ch. 90 (1985), provides for numerous exceptions to
the hearsay rule. See FLA. STAT. §§ 90.803-.804 (1985). However, it does not contain a catchall exception. The drafters believed that "the enumerated exceptions were the only types of
hearsay which possessed the minimal guarantees of reliability in order to be admissible." C.
EHRHARDT, FLORIDA EVIDENCE § 802.1 (2d ed. 1984).
9. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE

§ 224 (1954).

10. Chao, 453 So. 2d at 879; see, e.g., Camerlin v. Palmer Co., 92 Mass. (10 Allen) 539
(1865); State v. Noye, 36 Conn. 80 (1869).
11. See, e.g., State v. Fong Loon, 158 P. 233 (Idaho 1916); Garcia v. State, 68 N.W.2d
(Neb. 1955); People v. Randazzio, 87 N.E. 112 (N.Y. 1909); State v. Lopez, 631 P.2d 422
(Wash. Ct. App. 1981). For an overview of the states' positions on this issue, see generally
Annot., 12 A.L.R. 4TH 1016, 1021 (1982).
12. See Annot., 12 A.L.R. 4TH 1016, 1029-34 (1982).

1986]

THIRD-PARTY TESTIMONY

The most widely accepted rationale is that an interpreter operates
as an agent of the parties to the conversation."3 Some courts applying this rationale consider the testimony to be hearsay, admissible
only where it fits within an established exception to the hearsay
rule.14 In other jurisdictions where the interpreter/agent is viewed
as a medium of communication, the declarant is found implicitly to
have adopted the interpreter's words as his own. 15 In such cases,
"statements of the interpreter are admissible as original evidence
and are in no sense hearsay."'" Some jurisdictions have also found
such testimony to be admissible where the interpreter has "authenticated his translation by testifying that his interpretation was
accurately made.' 7 In these jurisdictions, the interpreter need not
testify concerning the content or accuracy of the statement. He has
only to authenticate his translation for the statement to be deemed
admissible.' 8 Granting the opponent an opportunity to cross-examine the interpreter responds to the hearsay rule's underlying
concerns regarding authentication.' 9
Finally, out-of-court statements made through an interpreter
and testified to by a third-party witness have been held admissible
when not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. 20 "An
out-of-court statement which is not offered to prove the truth of
the matter asserted, i.e., to prove that the facts contained in it are
13. Under this theory the interpreter is regarded as an agent of one or both parties
under common law agency principles. As early as 1773, these principles were followed when
allowing an interpreter's testimony into evidence. Annot., 116 A.L.R. 800, 805 (1938) (citing
Fabrigas v. Mostyn, 20 How. St. Tr. 82, 123 (Eng. 1773)); see also Boicelli v. Giannini, 224
P. 777 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1924) (interpreter acted as "joint agent" of the parties).
14. See, e.g., State v. Letterman, 616 P.2d 505, affd, 627 P.2d 484 (Or. 1980) (testimony
met requirements common to all exceptions to hearsay rule); State v. Agnesi, 104 A. 299
(N.J. 1918) (testimony qualified as dying declaration).
15. See Commonwealth v. Vose, 32 N.E. 355 (Mass. 1892).
16. Boicelli v. Giannini, 224 P. 777, 779 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1924). Several federal cases
have also applied this agency, or adoption, theory. See United States v. Alvarez, 755 F.2d
830 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 274 (1985); United States v. Da Silva, 725 F.2d 828
(2nd Cir. 1983); United States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
990 (1969).
17.

Annot., 12 A.L.R. 4TH 1016, 1026 (1982).

18. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Storti, 58 N.E. 1021 (Mass.1901).
19. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 9, § 224; see, e.g., State v. Letterman, 616 P.2d 505, affd,
627 P.2d 484 (Or. 1980); Ching Lur v. Lam Man Beu, 19 Hawaii 363 (1909).
20. See United States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 990
(1969) (statements admitted were only offered to prove a statement was made).
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true, is not hearsay. ' 21 In other words, testimony regarding an outof-court statement may be admitted to prove only that a statement
was made, but not to prove the truth of the statement's contents.
III. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT IN FLORIDA
Until recently, Florida case law concerning the admissibility of
third-party testimony regarding extrajudicial statements made
through an interpreter rested exclusively on the 1903 Florida Supreme Court decision in Meacham v. State.22 There, the court held
that third-party testimony regarding a translated conversation had
been improperly excluded. 23 Robert Meacham was charged with
embezzling the proceeds of sixty-three boxes of cigars that allegedly had been left with him on consignment. Meacham claimed
that the boxes had been sold to him with the "understanding that
he was to pay for them at a designated time. ' 24 To support his
contention, Meacham introduced the testimony of the interpreter
who translated his conversation with the Spanish-speaking cigar
seller. Meacham then tried to introduce the testimony of Robert
Lore, a witness to the translated conversation. The lower court excluded Lore's testimony as inadmissible hearsay. The Florida Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the interpreter operated
as the "necessary medium of communication, [whose words were]
adopted by both, and made a part of their conversation. ' '25 The
fact that the conversation was conducted through an interpreter
was found to "affect the weight, but not the competency, of the
'26
evidence.
Meacham involved a pure application of the "adoption" theory,
which is similar to the principles of common law agency. Two parties to a transaction had expressly agreed to conduct that transaction through an interpreter. Furthermore, the testimony of the
27
third party was substantiated by the interpreter's own testimony.
It is unclear from the opinion whether the court, in applying the
adoption theory, held that the testimony was not hearsay, or that
it was admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule. The re21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
(Mass.
26.
27.

C. EHRHARDT, supra note 8, § 801.4.
33 So. 983 (Fla. 1903).
Id.
Id.
Meacham, 33 So. 983 (Fla. 1903) (quoting Commonwealth v. Vose, 32 N.E. 355
1892)).
Id.
Id.
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suit was that the statements could be used against the declarant as
his own words.
More than fifty years passed before a Florida court again addressed the admissibility of extrajudicial statements made through
an interpreter. In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.
Ganz, 8 the Third District Court of Appeal held that statements
made to the plaintiff through an interpreter were inadmissible
hearsay. Ganz involved a civil claim against State Farm for willful
and malicious interference with attorney/client contracts. The
plaintiff, Ganz, was an attorney who had been asked to represent
twenty-six Puerto Rican farmworkers who had been injured in an
automobile/bus accident. The farmworkers released Ganz from the
case, but they later told him through an interpreter that State
Farm had coerced them into signing the release under the threat of
losing their jobs. The trial court allowed Ganz to submit testimony
into evidence concerning these statements.
The Third District reversed, finding that Ganz's testimony regarding the Puerto Ricans' statements made through their interpreter was excluded by the hearsay rule. "9 Because the person
seeking to testify to the statements was a party to the action, the
court concluded there were insufficient guarantees of trustworthiness in the testimony. Also, the interpreter was not called to testify, or to authenticate the translation." The court reasoned that
to allow such unsupported testimony into evidence for the purpose
of proving a major element of a claim would thwart the purpose of
the hearsay rule. No attempt was made to reconcile the Florida
Supreme Court's earlier decision in Meacham. Indeed, Meacham
was never mentioned by the majority. In a special concurrence,
however, Judge Pearson expressed his concern that the majority
opinion would be construed as "holding that all testimony as to
what was said through an interpreter is hearsay." 3' He opined that
such a conclusion would be contrary to Meacham.32
The analysis employed by the Ganz court was adopted by the
First District Court of Appeal in a 1983 case. In Rosell v. State,3
the court held that a deputy sheriff's testimony about a translated
conversation with two defendants was excludable hearsay. The de28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

119 So. 2d 319 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960).
Id. at 320-21.
Id. at 319.
Id. at 322 (Pearson, J., concurring).
Id.
433 So. 2d 1260 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), review denied, 446 So. 2d 100 (1984).

376

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:371

fendants, Ralphael Rosell and Ramiro Cabrera, drove past an agricultural inspection station without stopping. When authorities
halted them, they found several large garbage bags of marijuana in
their truck. Neither defendant spoke or understood English.
Shortly after the arrest, a deputy sheriff interrogated them with
the aid of an interpreter. At trial, Rosell and Cabrera maintained
that they had found the bags on the road and were unaware of
their contents. The interpreter testified that the defendants' only
statements had been "that they did not know what was in the
bags." 4 However, the deputy testified that the interpreter had said
the defendants thought the bags contained a grassy material. After
overruling the defendants' hearsay objection, the deputy's testi35
mony was admitted into evidence.
Citing Ganz, the First District reversed the trial court, concluding that the deputy's testimony was "clearly hearsay" that should
have been excluded. 6 Because Rosell and Cabrera were in police
custody and under interrogation, they could be considered to have
authorized the interpreter to speak for them. The court rejected
the state's argument that the defendants had adopted the statements, because "[t]hat argument [was] premised on the assumption that appellants understand English. '3 7 An additional factor
was the apparent inconsistency between the testimony of the interpreter and that of the interrogating officer. The interpreter's statements, which were not hearsay, were considerably more favorable
to the defendants than was the testimony of the deputy sheriff.
Although Meacham was not mentioned by the court, some confusion apparently existed over the adoption theory embodied in
that case and the adopted statements exception to the hearsay rule
under the Florida Evidence Code. 8 The Meacham adoption theory
contemplated application of principles of common law agency,
which is more analogous to the admissions exception for specifically authorized statements in the Florida Evidence Code than to
34.

Rosell, 433 So. 2d at 1262.

35. Id.
36. Id. at 1263. The court concluded that the marijuana bags should have been excluded
and reversed the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress. Therefore, it did not reach
the issue of whether the error in admitting the hearsay testimony was harmless or prejudicial. Id.
37. Id.
38. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(18) (1985) provides that certain hearsay statements are admissible even though the declarant is available as a witness. Those statements include a statement offered against a party in which that party "has manifested his adoption or belief in
its truth." Id.
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the adopted statements exception. 9 Under the adopted statements
exception, an adverse party who manifests his belief in or adopts
the statement of another person as his own may have that statement admitted into evidence against him.40 While generally the
adopted statements must be an express statement of agreement, in
some cases the adoption can be implied from the silence or inaction of the party, or when his conduct "circumstantially indicates
the party's assent to the truth of [the] statement.' 1 For these tacit
admissions to be admissible, the adverse party must have been
present and must have understood the statement before his action
or inaction could be considered an adoption. 42 It was this tacit
adoption theory that the Rosell court rejected.
The Third District addressed the issue again in 1984 and
reached a conclusion that differed from its decision in Ganz. In
Henao v. State,"3 a defendant charged with cocaine possession
made a statement in Spanish to a police officer through an interpreter. At trial, the police officer's testimony concerning the defendant's interpreted statements was confirmed by the interpreter.
Citing Meacham, the Third District rejected the defendant's contention that the officer's testimony was hearsay and thus erroneously admitted. 44 In dictum, the court noted that even had the officer's testimony been held inadmissible, it would have been
harmless error due to the interpreter's testimony. 48 The court did
not attempt to reconcile Henao with its earlier decision in Ganz, or
with the First District's decision in Rosell. These cases were simply
dismissed as being "dictum indicating [a] contrary rule without
citing Meacham," which the court considered controlling. 46 Chao
offered the supreme court an opportunity to revisit Meacham and
resolve the confusion surrounding this issue.
IV.

Chao v. State

In Chao v. State, the Third District reaffirmed its holding in
Henao.47 While acknowledging that Meacham could be limited to
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. § 90.803(18)(c).
Id. § 90.803(18)(b).
C. EHRHARDT, supra note 8, § 803.18b.
Id.
454 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984).
Id. at 20.
Id.
Id.
Chao, 453 So. 2d at 879-80.
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those situations where the defendant had a role in selecting the
interpreter, the court rejected this argument. Instead it construed
the rule announced in Meacham as stating that "the very act of
speaking through an interpreter constitutes an adoption of the interpreter's words as one's own."48

The Florida Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction because the
Chao and Henao decisions created a conflict with the First District's decision in Rosell.' 9 The supreme court rejected the Third
District's interpretation of Meacham as taking interpreted statements out of the hearsay rule, although the court acknowledged
that the Meacham opinion was difficult to fathom. "From a perspective of more than eighty years later, we cannot determine
whether the Court was holding that the statement was not hearsay
or that it was hearsay, but nevertheless admissible as an exception.

'5 0

The court noted that while the interpreter's statements fell

within the definition of hearsay, they were admissible under the
admissions exception for specifically authorized statements. 1
Under this exception, statements by a person specifically authorized to speak for a party are admissible when offered in evidence
against that party.52 Chao had authorized Mendez to speak for him
because Chao's request for Mendez to assist him in surrendering
"undoubtedly contemplated verbal communication with the police." ' A person who authorizes an agent to speak for him need
not hear-or, presumably, even understand-the subsequent statement for it to qualify as an admission.5 Thus, the construction of
the authorized statements exception by the supreme court nullified
the First District's suggestion in Rosell that a party must understand interpreted statements in order to adopt them.5 The supreme court affirmed Chao's conviction not because Detective Rigdon's recounting of the interpreted statements was not hearsay,
but because Chao had specifically authorized Mendez to speak for
him.
48. Id. at 880.
49. Chao, 478 So. 2d at 31. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3) provides that the supreme court
"may review any decision of a district court of appeal that ... expressly and directly conflicts with a decision of another district court of appeal or of the supreme court on the same
question of law."
50. Chao, 478 So. 2d at 32.
51. Id.
52. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(18)(c) (1985).
53. Chao, 478 So. 2d at 32.
54. Id.
55. Rosel, 433 So. 2d at 1263.
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In Chao, the Florida Supreme Court attempted to resolve the
inconsistent approaches taken by Florida courts by forming a coherent method of analysis for dealing with interpreted statements.
It started by applying the statutory definition of hearsay to the
testimony. When a third party offers testimony regarding statements of the interpreter to prove what the original declarant said,
such testimony meets the definition of hearsay. As hearsay, this
testimony must be excluded unless it falls within an exception to
the hearsay rule. In Chao, the testimony of Detective Rigdon regarding Chao's statements as made through an interpreter, fell
within the exception for statements by a specifically authorized
person. Therefore, it was admissible."
In Chao, the defendant requested Mendez's assistance, and
thereby authorized Mendez to interpret for him, thus adopting the
translated statements as his own. Where the interpreter is provided by the police, the situation is less clear. Whether an interpreter provided by the police is specifically authorized to speak for
an accused should depend upon the nature of the questioning, who
initiated the conversation with the police, and whether the defendant validly waived his fifth and sixth amendment rights.
The Florida Supreme Court's decision in Chao has shifted the
analysis of this issue from whether testimony of a third-party witness regarding statements made through an interpreter is hearsay
to whether, as hearsay, any exception to the hearsay rule applies. A
relevant statement that is not hearsay is presumptively admissible.
If a statement is hearsay, however, it is presumptively inadmissible
unless it fits an established exception to the hearsay rule. Because
this presumption of inadmissibility must be overcome by those
wishing to introduce interpreted statements, it may become more
difficult to use such evidence if the courts narrowly construe the
specifically authorized statements exception. Statements that may
not fit within this exception include those made after an arrest but
prior to the recitation of Miranda rights when an interpreter is
furnished by the police; when an interpreter overhears the conversation of an accused and relates it to another; or when an interpreter, authorized to communicate with one person, has related the
statements to another without express authorization.
When a party has been arrested and has validly waived his fifth
amendment rights, subsequent statements made through a policesupplied interpreter logically should constitute specific authoriza56.

Chao, 478 So. 2d at 32.
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tion for the interpreter to speak for him. The interpreter is offered
as a medium of communication with the police in a setting where
the fifth amendment rights of the accused have been established
and the adversarial nature of the interrogation is clear. When one
speaks to the police in such a situation, he should anticipate that
his remarks may be used against him. Furthermore, where the interpreter is a state employee, there should be no reason why he
cannot testify to authenticate his translation.
V.

CONCLUSION

Prior to the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Chao v. State,
Florida courts had not developed a cohesive legal analysis of the
issues presented by third-party testimony about out-of-court statements made through an interpreter. This shortcoming was alarming because Florida, with its large Spanish-speaking population, is
likely to be frequently confronted with such situations. In Chao,
the supreme court settled this question. The court held that such
statements are hearsay, but that the exception for specifically authorized statements may apply. Once a party authorizes an interpreter to speak for him, he need not hear or understand the subsequent statement; he implicitly adopts the interpreter's translated
statements as his own.
Future analysis of this issue probably will focus on what constitutes specific authorization within the meaning of the Florida Evidence Code. Certainly, one who provides his own interpreter has
authorized the interpreter to speak for him. Moreover, in a conversation between two parties, use of an interpreter demonstrates authorization of the interpreter to speak for them, at least for that
conversation.5 7 Arguably, this exception can be extended to a person in custody who validly waives his fifth amendment rights and
then speaks to police officers through a police interpreter. In any
event, the classification of interpreted statements as hearsay may
restrict their admissibility because of the presumption of inadmissibility that attaches. The courts, however, should strive for a balance between the interests of the state and the protection of the
accused. The right of the accused to be presented with the evidence against him, and the opportunity to cross-examine those
who testify against him, must be preserved.
George V. Matlock
57.

See, e.g., Meacham, 33 So. at 983.

